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Correct Answer:

The namespace can be defined in the "Mount path" field in the "Advanced options" section of the login screen. The mount path is the path where the auth method is enabled, and it can include a namespace prefix. For example, if the LDAP auth method is enabled at the pathns1/auth/ldap, where ns1 is the namespace, then the mount path field should be set to ns1/auth/ldap. This way, the Vault UI will log in to the correct namespace and auth method. Alternatively, the namespace can also be specified in the URL of the Vault UI, such as https://vault.example.com/ui/vault/auth/ns1/auth/ldap/login.

Correct Answer: A

The vault kv put command writes the data to the given path in the K/V secrets engine. The command requires the mount path of the K/V secrets engine, the secret path, and the key-value pair to store. The mount path can be specified with

the - mount flag or as part of the secret path. The key-value pair can be given as an argument or read from a file or stdin. The correct syntax for the command is:

vault kv put -mount=secret my-secrets/my-password 53cr3t or vault kv put secret/my-secrets my-password=53cr3t The other options are incorrect because they use the deprecated vault kv write command, or they have the wrong order or

format of the arguments.

References:

https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/commands/kv/put3, https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/commands/kv4

Correct Answer: B

The maximum time-to-live (TTL) for a token is defined by the lowest value among the following factors:

The authentication method that issued the token. Each auth method can have a default and a maximum TTL for the tokens it generates. These values can be configured by the auth method's mount options or by the auth method's specific

endpoints.

The mount endpoint configuration that the token is accessing. Each secrets engine can have a default and a maximum TTL for the leases it grants. These values can be configured by the secrets engine's mount options or by the secrets

engine's specific endpoints.

A parent token TTL. If a token is created by another token, it inherits the remaining TTL of its parent token, unless the parent token has an infinite TTL (such as the root token). A child token cannot outlive its parent token. System max TTL.

This is a global limit for all tokens and leases in Vault. It can be configured by the system backend's max_lease_ttl option. The client system that uses the token cannot define the maximum TTL for the token, as this is determined by Vault's

configuration and policies. The client system can only request a specific TTL for the token, but this request is subject to the limits imposed by the factors above.

References: https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/concepts/tokens3, https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/concepts/lease2, https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/commands/auth/tune4, https://developer.hashicorp.com/

vault/docs/commands/secrets/tune5, https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/commands/token/create6

Correct Answer: A

The error was thrown because the policy code contains an invalid capability, "write". The valid capabilities for a policy are "create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", and "sudo". The "write" capability is not recognized by Vault and should be

replaced with "create", which allows creating new secrets or overwriting existing ones. The other statements are not correct, because the wildcard (*) and the sudo capability are both valid in a policy. The wildcard matches any number of

characters within a path segment, and the sudo capability allows performing certain operations that require root privileges.

References:

[Policy Syntax | Vault | HashiCorp Developer]

Correct Answer: BD

A web application that uses Vault's transit secrets engine to encrypt data in- transit can benefit from the following security features: Even if the attacker was able to access the raw data, they would only have encrypted bits (TLS in transit). This means that the attacker would need to obtain the encryption key from Vault in order to decrypt the data, which is protected by Vault's authentication and authorization mechanisms. The transit secrets engine does not store the data sent to it, so the attacker cannot access the data from Vault either. The keys can be rotated and min_decryption_version moved forward to ensure this data cannot be decrypted. This means that the web application can periodically change the encryption key used to encrypt the data, and set a minimum decryption version for the key, which prevents older versions of the key from being used to decrypt the data. This way, even if the attacker somehow obtained an old version of the key, they would not be able to decrypt the data that was encrypted with a newer version of the key. The other statements are not true, because: You cannot rotate the encryption key so that the attacker won't be able to decrypt the data. Rotating the key alone does not prevent the attacker from decrypting the data, as they may still have access to the old version of the key that was used to encrypt the data. You need to also move the min_decryption_version forward to invalidate the old version of the key. The Vault administrator would not need to seal the Vault server immediately. Sealing the Vault server would make it inaccessible to both the attacker and the legitimate users, and would require unsealing it with the unseal keys or the recovery keys. Sealing the Vault server is a last resort option in case of a severe compromise or emergency, and is not necessary in this scenario, as the attacker does not have access to the encryption key or the data in Vault. References: Transit Secrets Engines | Vault | HashiCorp Developer, Encryption as a service: transit secrets engine | Vault | HashiCorp Developer